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LETTER FROM A READER 
In Volume 13 of this publication, on pages 26 and 27, you were made 
familiar with the circumstances and the legal issues in the case of 
Regina v. Phillips. 
Police had wanted to question a person who was suspected to have 
committed two armed robberies. They did not have sufficient grounds 
to obtain a warrant for the suspect's arrest. However, police had 
reasonable grounds to believe that he was at a certain address, which 
was not the suspect' s regular abode. The unsuccessful search of the 
home was conducted without the consent of the occupier. However, the 
officers encountered Mr. Phillips, alias Ward in the home who was in 
possession of ignition keys to stolen cars which were found parked out 
front. 
The County Court had disallowed the evidence against Phillips, alias 
Ward, as the search by which it was obtained was unlawful and 
unreasonable. Needless to say, this resulted in an acquittal. 
In reaction to our synopsis of the case, Chief Constable R. J. Stewart 
of the Vancouver Police Department wrote me a letter, the relevant 
portion of which reads as follows: 
"I would like to comment on an article in your publication 
Issues of Interest, Volume 1113. This is an interesting 
subsequent tale relating to the item on page 26, 'Regina v. 
Phillips (alias Ward)'. After Phillips was arrested, it was 
learned through a fingerprint analysis that he was in fact, 
a person by the name of Gordon Michael Ward. At the time of 
his arrest in the name of Phillips, he appeared on C.P.I.C. 
under the name of Ward and was wanted for being unlawfully 
at large, being an escapee from a B. C. Corrections 
facility. There were two other warrants, one for failing to 
appear in a Provincial Court and the second for failing to 
appear in the County Court. 
When you consider this information, which was unknown to the 
police and to the County Court Judge, the Judge's remarks 
seem almost facetious. 
I thought you might find this information interesting and 
worthy of comment at some later date". 
The County Court Judge had expressed belief that the community would 
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be shocked by the action of the police and he, congratulating police 
on their good investigative work, had, nevertheless, found that the 
rights and liberties of Phillips had been seriously infringed. If it 
was not for the narrow legal issue involved, then considering 
Phillips' apparent gross disregard for and his alleged contempt of the 
Court and its process, the Judge's counnents do indeed appear facetious 
and generous to Phillips. 
Chief Stewart, thank you for the information and for taking the time 
to share it with us. 
* * * * * 
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POLICE INFORMERS 
CAN POLICE BE COMPELLED TO REVEAL IDENTITY OF INFORMER 
POLICE SHIELD LAW 
SECRECY RULE - CROWN'S PRIVILEGE 
Biscillon v. Keable et. al. 7 c.c.c. (3d) 385 
Supreme Court of Canada 
In the seventies the Quebec Government gave a mandate to what became 
known as the Keable Commission. The mandate included a number of inter-
esting items the Commission was to investigate and report on. Some 
relate to police practices in specific incidents and others to police 
procedures in general. Many of the issues raised in this case ought to 
be of interest to the Canadian police community. 
The Commission was created by an Order in Council which was challenged 
in 1978 and was held to be intra vires the Quebec cabinet. In 1979 this 
cabinet added to the mandate, among other things, that the commission 
was to examine "the recruitment of informers by illegal or reprehensibe 
means". 
Officers of the Montreal police department were subpoenaed to appear 
before the Commission. The Director of the department who feared that 
the officers would be asked to identify their informers and how they 
were recruited, filed an affidavit with the commission stressing how 
harmful it would be to the enforcement of criminal law if police 
officers have to reveal such information. Also that it would be 
contrary to the public interest to divulge in public the identity of the 
informers. This affidavit was to no avail and three officers were 
questioned by the commissioner. Instead of having counsel intervene on 
their behalf, raise the issue of privilege or apply any other legal 
means, the officers refused to testify and read out a lengthy statement 
entitled: "Why we refuse to answer the Keable Commission". It spoke of 
kangaroo court, bias and the bourgeois state. Later the superior court 
which reviewed the officers' legal position labelled the paper as 
"diatribe" (ouch). 
The officers' refusal, of course, was referred to the superior courts of 
Quebec which ordered them to answer the commissioner's questions, 
including those related to the recruitment, management and identity of 
police informers. These courts realized that at common law police 
officers do not have to and cannot divulge such information. However, 
section 308 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, conceding that a 
government official cannot be obliged to divulge what he learned in the 
exercise of his function, restricts that obligation to situations where 
the judge finds that disclosure is contrary to public order. In other 
words, where the Court holds that disclosing the information is not 
contrary to public order, the official is obliged to answer the 
questions put to him. The Quebec superior courts held that police 
officers are public officials and, therefore, held that the officers 
were compelled to answer the commissioner's questions, including those 
regarding police informers. 
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The matter was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada, which clearly 
spelled out a number of legal and constitutional issues relevant to the 
role and position of the police officer. 
Firstly, the Court ruled that provided the mandate to a commission 
investigating police practices is specific in terms of incidents, cases 
and events it is to report on, it is intra vires the executive branch of 
a provincial government. In other words, the mandate, like a search 
warrant, cannot be a fishing licence for all species in relevant 
waters. Furthermore, such a mandate must not be to investigate "the 
powers, duties and capacities" of police officers, but is only 
appropriate if it concerns itself with the manner in which "they were in 
fact exercised in the circumstances described in the mandate". 
In 19811, the Supreme Court of Canada 
axiomatic" (something generally accepted as 
has power to take disciplinary actions 
R.C.M.P.) and municipal police officers. 
the Keable Commission was appropriate. 
"implicitly recognized as 
being true) that a province 
against provincial (except 
Hence the Quebec mandate to 
Secondly, the Supreme Court of Canada held that section 308 of the 
Quebec Code of Civil Procedure (the only province that has such a code) 
did not supersede the common law. Said the Court: 
"In my opinion the Quebec Legislature did not, in enacting Act 
308 of the Code of Civil Procedure, intend to abrogate or 
limit the secrecy rule regarding the identity of police 
informers". 
It seems the Court said in addition, that even if that had been the 
intent of the Quebec law makers, no Legislature can constitutionally 
abrogate the limits of this common law rule; or, no provincial law can 
compel a police officer to reveal the identity of an informer in 
criminal or civil proceedings. Furthermore, the Court (for the sake of 
coming to grips with the impact of section 308 on this issue) assumed 
that police officers were government officials, but added in the same 
breath that this must not be seen as confirming that they are. (As a 
matter of fact, it is very doubtful that they are). 
The Supreme Court of Canada then went into considerable depth in regards 
to the secrecy rule. It was recognized centuries ago that the 
government would come to an abrupt halt if it did not have a 
considerable amount of information available. Particularly when this 
information is personal, disclosure is sensitive and can be harmful. 
It should therefore not be used for purposes other than those for which 
it was given to the government. Although there are times when the 
public interest outweighs the interest of the individual and 
confidentiality, the state ·is entitled to its secrets, particularly 
1 A. G. Alberta et. al. v. Putnam et. al. 62 c.c.c. (2d) 51 
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where it 
government. 
Court said: 
touches on national security and effective conduct of 
In regards to this (known as the "Crown's privilege") the 
"There are cases in which the public interest obvious~y 
demands secrecy; and there are borderline cases. The common 
law allows a member of the Executive* to make the initial 
decision; if he decides in favour of secrecy and states his 
reason for doing so in a sworn statement, the law empowers the 
judge to review the information and in the last resort the 
decision by weighing the two conflicting interests, that of 
maintaining secrecy and that of doing justice". 
Over the years, many have included "police secrecy" in this "Crown's 
privilege" and believed that when a police officer is asked in public 
proceedings who his informer is, then the Judge 'must consider and weigh 
the above mentioned conflicting interests. The Supreme Court of Canada 
called such belief a matter of confusion and a mistaken belief. The 
Court clearly held that the secrecy rule regarding police informers' 
identity is separate and distinct from Crown privilege. 
In reviewing the historical development of the police secrecy rule, the 
Court went as far back as . 17941 when it was established. In 18902 it 
was held that the rule also applies in civil law. The Court referred in 
that case to 
• • • the well established rule of law that the identity of 
police informers may not be disclosed in a civil action, 
whether by process of discovery or by oral evidence at trial". 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the secrecy rule regarding police 
informers is now a rule of evidence in criminal as well as civil 
proceedings which imposes a duty on a peace officer as well as on the 
judiciary. The Court went as far as to suggest that a police officer is 
prohibited from disclosing the identity of an informer in judicial 
proceedings, even where the Court considers the public interest superior 
to that of the administration of justice. The Court added that there is 
even a greater and stronger duty on a police officer to keep the 
identity of his informer confidential outside judicial proceedings and 
suggested that revealing the identification may amount to obstructing 
justice. The Supreme Court of Canada held that this secrecy rule cannot 
be waived and that a judge must not consider whether the officer must 
answer the question but must simply not allow i t to be put. The Court 
* A Cabinet Minister 
1 R. v. Hardy (24 St. Tr. 199) 
2 Marks v. Bayfris (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 494 
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concluded that this common law rule applies also to a public inquiry 
into the administration of justice. Said the Court: 
"The common law did not give a peace officer this right simply 
because it would be useful to him, but because it concluded 
empirically that the right was necessary. It is certainly not 
possible to go so far as to say that, without this right, a 
peace officer would be entirely powerless and the criminal 
laws would be totally ineffective. However, the inability of 
the one to act and the ineffectiveness of the other would 
reach a point where they could no longer be tolerable". 
Some additional interesting points on this subject were the inevitable 
exception to the secrecy rule. There is, according to the Supreme Court 
of Canada, only one exception and that is in criminal proceedings only, 
where the identity of the informer can demonstrate the innocence of the 
accused. 
Another point made was that an informer may well be a witness in the 
proceedings. Is he, in cross examination for instance, compelled to 
answer when he is asked if he is the informer? The Court's reply to 
this question was "No". However, it is vague whether the witness, who 
was in fact the informer, can waive the exclusionary rule that protects 
him. When that happens there may not be any need for the rule any more, 
as the informer obviously no longer feels threatened. 
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Canada ordered the commission to 
stay 
any proceedings, inquiry or examination compelling, or 
tending to compel, appellant (police officer) to disclose the 
identity of his informer, or to produce documents from which 
their identity can be established, ••• " 
* * * * * 
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PROVINCIAL POLICE OFFICER MAKING A DEMAND FOR BREATH SAMPLES IN A 
MUNICIPALITY POLICED BY ITS OWN POLICE FORCE. DOES FAILURE OF 
COMPLIANCE WITH POLICE ACT AFFECT AUTHORITY? 
The Queen and McCarthy County Court of Westminster, New Westminster 
Registry No. X82-8365 September 1983 
A R.C.M. Police officer followed a car from a municipality which is 
policed by the R.C.M.P. into a city which has its own municipal police 
service, "where he made observations of the appellant causing the 
constable to make a demand for samples of breath". The readings of 
170 mg. resulted in a conviction for over 80 mg. "at or near" the 
district policed by the R.C.M.P. 
The accused appealed the conviction claiming that the officer had no 
jurisdiction to make the demand in the city with its own police force. 
The matter was not argued on the officer's jurisdiction in respect to 
his oath of office (which could have been the case if he was a 
'municipal constable') but the issue was debated on non-compliance 
with the provisions of B.C. 's Police Act. Section 15 of that Act 
states that when a provincial constable (R.C.M.P. officer) exercises 
his jurisdiction in a municipality with its own force, he must, where 
possible in advance or in any event promptly thereafter, notify that 
municipal force. In this case the Crown adduced no evidence that the 
city force had been notified and the defence claimed that this non-
compliance with the Police Act deprived the officer from jurisdiction 
to make the demand for breath samples. 
The County Court rejected this defence theory and held that the 
legislation simply provides a protocol or courtesy of a notification 
when this member of one force does business within the geographical 
jurisdiction of another. Section 15 was not enacted to "stultify" 
investigations. A failure to comply should have no more than a 
disciplinary consequence. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
Conunent: It should be noted that the Court held that the well-known 
B. C. case of R. v. Whitel was, for obvious reasons, found to be 
distinguishable from this case. It dealt with a municipal constable 
making a demand in an area policed by the R.C.M.P. while it was not 
a matter of fresh pursuit. In that case the Court was most generous 
in its interpretation of the Police Act and held that the demand was 
authorized and the municipal constable had jurisdiction. 
1(1978) 9 B.C.L.R. 179 County Court Decision 
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Those interested in this topic may wish to read R. v. Arsenault! a 
synopsis of which can be found on page 11 of Volume 3 of this 
publication, along with an article on jurisdictional issues in B. C. 
* * * * * 
1 R. v. Arsenault 55 c.c.c. (2d) 38 New Brunswick Court of Appeal 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
LIABILITY OF "OWNER" OF MOTOR VEHICLE 
The Queen and Watch Supreme Court of B. C. Vancouver Registry No. 
CC831258 and CC831158 October 1983 
Mr. Watch was, under the provisions of sections 76 and 62 of the Motor 
Vehicle Act, charged with Hit and Run. Obviously it was unknown to 
the Crown who was driving the car (owned by Mr. Watch) when it was 
involved in a hit and run accident. 
The defence had claimed that the combination of the two sections 
created an "absolute liability" which is, since the Constitution Act 
became effective, contrary to section 7 (principles of fundamental 
justice) and section 11 (presumption of innocence) of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. 
In criminal law there are three distinct liabilities: 
1 . In matters of outright crime or offences under provincial 
statutes where a prerequisite intent is clearly indicated, (for 
instance that something must be done "wilfully", "intentionally", 
"knowingly", etc.) ~ rea is required; 
2 . All other offences must presume to be strict liability offences 
which have mistake of fact, due diligence and care as defences; 
and 
3. Offences of absolute liability where the defence of reasonable 
care is not available. 
The Provincial Court Judge before whom Mr. Watch appeared, had held 
that the sections (62 and 76) created an absolute liability offence 
which was now unconstitutional. The accuracy of that conclusion was 
tested in the B. C. Supreme Court which applied a definition created 
by the Supreme Court of Canadal: 
"Offences of absolute liability would be those in respect of 
which the Legislature had made it clear that . guilt would 
follow proof merely of the proscribed act". 
In other words, if "due diligence and reasonable care" are defences to 
a person charged with an offence as the owner of a motor vehicle, then 
the offence must be one of strict liability. 
The court reasoned that the motor vehicle laws are there to render our 
streets places of safe and orderly conduct. It provides that if the 
1 R. v. Sault St. Marie [ 1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299. 
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driver of a car who violates these rules is not identified "there is 
still an avenue of enforcement" in that the owner can be charged. It 
is reasonable to assume that the owner of a vehicle under normal 
circumstances controls the use of his vehicle. However, should 
someone take the motor vehicle without the owner having entrusted the 
vehicle to him, then there is a defence. If due diligence and 
reasonable care is exercised in controlling the use of the car the 
person accused of an offence under this status liability provision, 
can escape liability. 
Therefore, the creation of liability under s. 76 M.V.A. does not 
violate section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
* * * * * 
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ADEQUACY OF AN INFORMATION TO OBTAIN SEARCH WARRANT 
Jackson and The Queen, B.C. Court of Appeal CA 000709 November 1983 
Police were granted a search warrant for the accused's home. A 
quantity of marihuana was found in a nearby garage and the accused was 
charged accordingly. He applied unsuccessfully to have the search 
warrant quashed and took his plight to the B. C. Court of Appeal. 
A "Justice" may issue a search warrant when satisfied upon the 
"information" sworn before him that there are "reasonable grounds for 
believing" that there is a narcotic in the place to be searched. In 
this case a police officer swore that he had received information from 
a colleague that he saw a number of marihuana plants growing in an 
orchard owned by the accused. The information, however, did not say 
when this was seen, did not give the location of the orchard and did 
not link the accused with the contraband. The source of the 
information was, no doubt, reliable. But did the content of the sworn 
document give the "Justice" grounds to conclude that there was 
marihuana in the accused's home? Did the information disclose grounds 
for the "Justice" to be satisfied that on the date the warrant was 
issued, some of the marihuana earlier seen growing in the accused's 
orchard, was now in his home? 
The B. C. Court of Appeal concluded that there had been insufficient 
evidence for the Justice to issue the search warrant. However, if the 
Court quashed the warrant it would put the accused in a legal position 
"to claim the return of the illegal substance". 
Although the search warrant was not validly issued, the accused's 
application was dismissed. 
Comment: In the past these kinds of applications were rare. It did 
not profit a person to incur the legal expense to have a search 
warrant quashed. The admissibility of the evidence did not depend on 
the validity of the search warrant by which it was obtained. Most of 
these applications were in regard to warrants by means of which 
documents were seized. 
However, with our exclusionary .rule under s. 24(2) of the Charter, a 
quashed search warrant may well enhance an accused's ability to show 
(on the balance of probabilities) that there was an infringement of 
his rights, that the search was unreasonable and that the evidence 
should be excluded. 
* * * * * 
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ARSON - CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE - SIMILAR FACT EVIDENCE 
On pages 27, 28 and 29 of Volume 10 of this publication is a synopsis of 
the case: 
The Queen v. Whittaker The County Court of Vancouver December 1982, No. 
CC821382 Vancouver Registry 
The accused lived in an apartment building. On the day of the alleged 
offence (arson), he alerted his landlady of a fire in a hallway around 
the entrance door of a recreation room. The accused had used the fire 
extinguisher to put it out. After all the excitement was over he 
went to a bar and was followed by police who found him back again at the 
scene of the fire examining the extinguisher. 
The accused gave versions of his involvement to · the landlady, an 
insurance adjuster, the police and in testimony to the Court. They were 
totally inconsistent with one another and found not worthy of belief. 
The Court thought the testimony 'not credible' and a complete 
fabrication. 
The Crown sought a conviction based on circums.tantial evidence comprised 
mostly of similar fact evidence of arson fires in which the accused was 
involved. The false statements made by the accused, were also claimed 
to have some weight contrary to his interest. 
It is only natural for police to concentrate on persons they know to be 
predispositioned to counnit the crime under investigation. Particularly 
where the belief for such predisposition is based on previous 
convictions for similar offences. 
However, "no number of similar offences can connect a particular person 
with a particular crime ...... Therefore, before similar fact evidence 
is admissible, it must be shown to be relevant and have some probative 
value. It simply cannot be admitted to show bad character on the part 
of the accused and/or that because of previous similar acts he is likely 
to have committed the one for which he is tri.ed. The prejudice created 
by the admission of such evidence would far outweigh its evidentiary 
value. 
Then what can it be used for? The Courts have permitted it in evidence 
where the evidence 
••• "may be so relevant if it bears upon the 
question whether the acts alleged to constitute the 
crime charged in the indictment were designed or 
accidental, or to rebut a defence which would 
otherwise be open to the accused" or for "other 
relevant, probative purpose ...... 
In other words, if there is nothing to connect the accused with the 
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crime charged other than evidence of bad character and of having 
committed similar crimes before, the similar fact evidence must be 
rejected. 
The Court gave an example of the use of similar fact evidence. If in a 
rape case the perpetrator had, during the act, done something bizarre in 
the circumstances such as reciting a poem, for instance, then, if he had 
done this before while having sexual intercourse and if the issue is one 
of identity, the similar fact evidence of that unusual behaviour is 
admissible. Of course the purpose is not to show that he raped before 
but to prove his habit of reciting poetry while having sexual inter-
course. 
In this case , the circumstantial evidence adduced by the Crown shows 
either miraculous coincidences of the accused's presence at mysterious 
fires or it demonstrates that the accused · has a severe problem and 
suffers of pyromania. The Crown showed that within 8 months several 
fires broke out in the immediate presence of the accused. 
1. A fire broke out in a large garbage container in a basement room of 
the apartment building in which the accused resided. Despite the 
early morning hour, the accused was at the scene advising on the 
sprinkler system. 
2. A few weeks later, the fire occurred which resulted in this charge 
of arson against the accused. Besides the accused's involvement 
outlined above, the police who followed him from a bar to the 
apartment block lost sight of him for a few minutes. During these 
minutes a fire was started in a breezeway between two buildings. 
The location was in the path of the accused. Although the accused's 
connection is tenuous, the evidence has some weight. 
3. Approximately one week later a car was deliberately set on fire in 
the underground garage of the accused's apartment building. Again, 
he was at the scene. 
4. Two months later, and two weeks after the accused moved into another 
apartment building, a car was deliberately set on fire in the under-
ground parking lot. The accused who shared his new apartment with a 
girlfriend was, according to the friend, completely dressed when he 
awakened her to evacuate the apartment. The accused had received a 
ride in the car the previous day; yet he inquired of his friend if 
she knew anyone who had a car like the one that burned in the 
underground garage. 
5. Two weeks later the accused partied with another girlfriend (the 
fire chief's daughter) in the girl's apartment. He had quite a bit 
to drink and walked the four blocks to his own apartment in the 
early morning hours. After the accused's departure, two vehicles in 
the underground parking lot were found on fire. The girlfriend had 
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urged the accused to use a side entrance to leave. She had watched 
out for him but he had not used that exit. While on his way to his 
apartment and in the normal path of travel between the two apartment 
buildings, fires were set to a news paper building, and the sauna 
area in the the accused's building. The accused had set off the 
alarm and helped to evacuate the building. In regards to the 
newspaper building, he phoned the fire department to report the 
fire. 
All this evidence implicates the accused and shows opportunity. This, 
coupled with the accused's false statements, was sufficient to find that 
the burden of proof had been met. However, the Court held that the lies 
must not receive separate consideration and are part of the circum-
stantial evidence. 
"To conclude the accused is simply the victim of a 
huge set of unhappy coincidences, 'a run of bad 
luck' as the accused puts it, is too shocking to 
common sense to prove an overall rational conclu-
sion contrary to that of guilt". 
The only rational conclusion was the guilt of the accused, and his trial 
resulted in a conviction. 
* * * * * 
Whittaker has now successfully appealed his conviction to the B. C. 
Court of Appeal which gave its reasons for judgement on December 2, 1983 
(Vancouver Registry CA000045). 
Whittaker claimed, in essence, that the circumstantial evidence to prove 
similar facts were inadequate to link him to the fire which resulted in 
him being accused of arson. The B. C. Court of Appeal unanimously 
agreed and held that, although the trial judge had accurately stated the 
law in respect to "similar fact" evidence, he had failed to apply it. 
The Crown had failed to show a link between the accused and the setting 
of the fires at which he was suspiciously present. It would not be 
surprising if the Appeal Court Justices were of the opinion that the 
aggregate of the evidence of the accused's presence at all of these 
fires certainly would cause a reasonable person to suspect, if not to be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused is a pyromaniac. 
However, there simply was no evidence at all that the accused had set 
the fire despite the finger of suspicion the evidence pointed at him. 
Therefore, there was no link between those fires and the accused (other 
than evidence of opportunity) and the evidence of them and the accused's 
presence did not amount to "similar fact" evidence. 
Appeal allowed - conviction quashed. 
* * * * * 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
REFUSAL TO GIVE SAMPLES OF BREATH - NOT BEING INFORMED OF RIGHTS 
Regina v. McRae Provincial Court of B. c. Prince George B. C. November 
1983 
The accused was seen driving erratically. He showed every symptom of 
impairment and was arrested. He was not informed of his rights to 
counsel and testified that he was outrightly refused to contact a 
lawyer. Subsequently, the accused refused to give samples of his 
breath. 
The accused was convicted of impaired driving but the Judge had some 
difficulty to hold that the failure of informing the accused of his 
rights to counsel had no consequences. The Judge did not believe the 
accused when he testified that he had been refused an opportunity to 
call a lawyer. Furthermore, it was obvious that the accused was 
confused about the law when he was demanded to give samples of his 
breath. 
The courts differ in opinion about the consequential effects of a 
failure to inform a suspect of his rights to counsel. It is an 
infringement of a right and a court is empowered to remedy that wrong 
(section 24(1) Charter). Subsection: (2) of that section states that 
evidence that is obtained by such an infringement may be excluded after 
the Court considers all circumstances and finds that admitting the 
evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeall expressed the opinion that a Court can 
exclude evidence as a remedy under subsection ( 1) OR by the provisions 
under subsection (2). The B. C. Court of Appeal2Ciisagrees with this 
opinion and held in the Collins case that the Courts can only exclude 
evidence by means of the provisions in subsection (2) of section 24 of 
the Charter, where an infringement of a person's rights has been shown. 
The latter case was, of course, binding on the Provincial Court Judge. 
He considered all circumstances and felt that the administration of 
justice would be brought into disrepute if, in the circumstances, he 
admitted the evidence of the refusal to blow. 
1 R. v. Therens (1983) 33 
2 R. v. Collins 1983 
publication on page 1. 
Accused convicted of impaired driving. 
Acquitted on refusing to give samples 
of breath. 
* * * * * 
C.R. (3d) 204 
CA 821232. Also see Volume 12 of this 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
DRINKING-DRIVING PROCEDURES 
Regina v. Keaney County Court of Cariboo Quesnel Registry 27/83. 
December 1983 
The accused was tried for "over 80 mg". The Crown had only one witness, 
the arresting officer. The testimony revealed that the officer pulled 
the accused over and had, from the symptoms he observed, good reason to 
believe the accused's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol. The 
officer did not make a formal demand but told the accused to come back 
to the detachment to undergo a breathalyzer test. He did not arrest the 
accused but placed him in the enclosed back seat of his cruiser from 
which the accused could not alight without help from outside. He was 
not informed of his rights to counsel. 
The reason why the officer had not made the proper demand was that he 
had a "gut feeling" what reaction that would have produced. At the 
office the accused said, "Well, aren't I entitled to call a lawyer?" At 
this point the officer did make the demand and read the accused his 
rights. In 40 minutes the accused made eight calls during one of which 
he was heard begging to let him speak to a lawyer. He was then given 
three minutes or "face the consequences". He blew and the analyses 
resulted in readings of 180 and 170 mg. 
The Provincial Court Judge convicted the accused, who appealed claiming 
that the evidence of analyses ought to have been excluded due to 
infringement of his constitutional rights. 
The County Court Judge did not seem impressed with the officer's 
performance, however, he held that there were not sufficient reasons to 
ex lude the evidence. Admitting it, does not bring the administration 
of justice in disrepute, he reasoned. ·the accused demonstrated that he 
knew and understood his right to counsel and the words used by the 
officer were sufficient to convey the reason for having to accompany 
him. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
RIGHTS TO TRIAL WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME 
Attorney General for B. C. and His Honour Judge Craig and John A. C. 
Carter Supreme Court of B. C. October 1983. 
In April of 1980 the accused Carter allegedly committed rape, buggery 
and gross indecency. In January of 1983 a four count information was 
sworn charging Carter with these offences. 
The Judge of the Provincial Court, after he heard evidence related to 
the delay of three years, entered a judicial stay of proceedings as a 
remedy to the infringement of Carter's right to stand trial within a 
reasonable time. The Crown took the matter by means of "extraordinary 
remedy" to the Supreme Court of B. C. 
The ruling by the Supreme Court Justice, ordering the Provincial Court 
Judge to proceed with the case, is as significant to the meaning of 
section ll(b) of the Charter as it is to a sprinter to know where the 
race begins and where the finish line is. 
The Justice held that the time that must be considered for the purpose 
of this section is that between the laying of the information and the 
accused coming before a Court to be dealt with according to law. In 
some cases, "exceptional cases", the delay before the charge being laid 
may be considered but for all practical purposes it is as stated above. 
* * * * * 
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IS IMPORTING A NARCOTIC A CONTINUING OFFENCE OR DOES THE ACT OF 
IMPORTING STOP UPON THE NARCOTICS CROSSING THE BORDER? 
Harris Bell and The Queen Supreme Court of Canada, November 1983 
The accused had footstools shipped to him from Jamaica. Upon arrival in 
Toronto, customs officers found that the footstools contained 
marihuana. They notified police and shipped the stools to the Mirabel 
Airport in Montreal. Police took the footstools to their office, 
removed most of the marihuana and returned them to the airport from 
where the accused picked them up. The accused was acquitted of 
importing by the trial judge who held that the police intervention had 
broken the chain of possession and that "importation" had been completed 
before the accused received the goods. The Court of Appeal reversed 
this decision and the accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The majority decision of this Court was that, although "importing a 
narcotic is not of a continuing nature", and is complete upon the entry 
of the goods into the country, the intervention by the R.C.M.P. was "in 
the circumstances" irrelevant. In other words, it did not interfere 
with the importing by the accused. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
* * * * * 
Comment: The conclusion of this case is not nearly as significant as 
the reasoning to arrive at it. It is hard to say which (the conclusion 
or the reasoning) was the means and which the end. It seems that the 
reasoning of many tribunals is becoming less clear and decisive. Unless 
it is the hardening of my arteries that cause this, it seems that the 
reasons for judgement rendered by the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court of Canada are increasingly difficult to fathom or follow. Also, 
recently set precedents are departures from well established law for 
reasons that do not seem to justify the change. In this case, to decide 
whether "importing" is a continuing offence,, the Supreme Court Justices 
explored and compared the act of "importing" with theft, possession of 
stolen property and other crimes, even murder. Theft which has always 
been considered a continuing offencel was in the reasoning of this Bell 
case identified as an offence which is not continuing after it is 
complete. Assuming the principal thief receives help somewhere along 
1 Regina v. Campbell 2 c.c.c. 
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the line from someone. If that someone joins in before the completion 
of the offence of theft then he must be charged as a party to the 
offence and can be charged jointly with the principal offender. If he 
joins the action after the offence is completed, then he can only be 
charged as an accessory after the fact. In other words, if the offence 
is of the continuing kind, he is a party to it, if not he is an 
accessory only. 
The criminal law states that when a person begins to cause something to 
become moveable for the purpose of stealing it, the offence of theft is 
complete. Assuming that a thief moves a heavy object for the purpose of 
stealing it, but he cannot handle it by himself. A friend, who knows 
that his buddy is committing theft, comes and helps remove the stolen 
property. According to the definition of theft, the offence was 
complete and the assistant is only an accessory after the fact. 
However, for decades it was held that, despite the definition of theft, 
the offence was a continuing one and the assistant in the scenario 
described above is a party to the offence. In view of what the Supreme 
Court of Canada said in its reasons for judgement is this law now a 
thing of the past? I guess we'll have to start all over again and see 
how other courts interpret the interpretation of theft by the Supreme 
Court of Canada. Perhaps the rumored new definition of theft will make 
this question an academic one; who knows. 
* * * * * 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS - UNREASONABLE SEARCH 
Regina v. Morrison 6 C.C.C. (3d) 256 
Vancouver County Court 
The accused was found acting suspiciously in a place frequented by 
drug traffickers. His behaviour became more suspicious after they 
searched his companion and found nothing. The accused was given a 
choice, he either had to accompany the officers to the station or 
allow himself to be searched in the bathroom of a nearby restaurant. 
The accused selected the latter and the search resulted in a bag of 
cannabis being found attached to his underwear. He was not arrested 
prior to the search. 
Section 10(1) of the Narcotic Control Act authorizes a peace officer, 
upon the well-known reasonable belief, to enter and search any place 
except a dwelling house and search any person found in such place. In 
this case the accused raised the old argument that "place" in the 
section does not include a public place. He submitted that it only 
refers to constitutionally protected places. His counsel was fully 
aware that case law tends to defeat his argument larticularly" in view 
of a decision made by a B. c. County Court in 1977 • However, he per-
suaded the Provincial Court Judge that since the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms became effective (April 1982) the judicial precedents on this 
subject are no longer valid. The Provincial Court Judge agreed and 
acquitted the accused and the Crown appealed. 
The County Court Judge found that the officers had reasonable grounds 
to believe the accused was in possession of a narcotic. Secondly, it 
was reiterated that: 
"'place' does include a street, lane or other place where 
the public may have unrestricted access" • 
••• I am of the view that a street falls within the 
definition of 'any place' and as such a peace officer is 
entitled without warrant to search such location". 
The Trial Court had expressed fear that if a street was included in 
"any place" as used in section 10 N.C.A., then police could search 
"any person" in "any place" for narcotics if, for instance, the 
particular street was known to be frequented by drug peddlers. That, 
said the County Court Judge, would undoubtedly be unreasonable. 
l See article 
publication. 
on this issue on page 6 of Volume 
Also Regina v. Hamilton B.C.L.R. 7 146. 
11 of this 
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Referring to B. C. cases and applying the principles established by 
them, the County Court Judge held: 
"In my view, •• s. 10 of the Narcotic Control Act can be 
restricted to authorize searches of places and persons on 
the basis of a peace officer having a reasonable belief of 
the existence of a narcotic and that there must be a nexus 
or a connection between the place, the person and the 
narcotic". (Underlining is mine). 
The search the officers conducted was lawful, not unreasonable and , 
therefore, not contrary to section 8 of the Charter of Rights. 
Crown's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered. 
* * * * * 
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THE MEANING OF "PLACE" 
SEARCHING A PERSON FOR NARCOTICS 
Regina v. Mitchell Vancouver County Court Registry No. CC830693 October 
1983 
Two police officers walked through an alley which is notorious for the 
sale of drugs and narcotics as well as the places which exit into this 
passageway. 
The officers melled the smoke of marihuana and saw three men coming out 
of a "dark bushy area". The accused was one of them. He was advised 
that the officer had grounds to believe that~ he (the accused) had 
marihuana on him. The search produced a gram of cocaine. However, he 
was acquitted in Provincial Court. The Judge felt that a stop had to 
be put to police conducting unreasonable searches like this. The 
officers had depended on section lO(a) and (b) of the Narcotic Control 
Act which authorizes a peace officer to enter "any place" and to search 
any person found in such "place". The trial judge held that a public 
place was not included in "any place". He felt it only referred to 
private places the police had no right to enter without warrant 1• As 
the search was unreasonable, it was contrary to section 8 of the Charter 
and the judge excluded the evidence. 
The County Court Judge found the trial judge had erred in nearly all 
these issues. A public place is included in "any place" 2. The search 
was in circumstances which would create in a reasonable man a reasonable 
suspicion3. 
The evidence should have been admitted if the trial judge had applied 
the precedents binding on him. Furthermore, the County Court Judge held 
that the exclusion of evidence by the trial judge had been predominantly 
for disciplinary reasons. Again, the superior· courts (see the Collins 
case) have held that in Canada, disciplining police is not a function of 
the Courts . 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
New trial ordered. 
* * * * * 
1 See page 6 of Volume 11 of this publication on this issue. 
2 Regina v. Morrison Unreported. County Court Regina v. Hamilton 
B.C.L.R. 7 146 (1977) 
3 Regina v. Collins 33 CR (3rd) 131. Also page 1 of Volume 12 of 
this publication. 
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DANGEROUS DRIVING - DEFENCE OF DURESS 
Regina v. Darryl County Court of Cariboo, Prince George B. C. 126/82 
August 1983 
The accused was in a gas station and made a comment to the girl 
attendant. A group of "thugs" in another car in a "simulated intent of 
misguided chivalry" picked a fight with the accused. The girl phoned 
police. Before the gendarmes arrived things got out of hand and the 
accused drove away to escape the grievous bodily harm he had good reason 
to believe would be inflicted if he stayed around. He was pursued by 
two cars, the occupants of which were armed with baseball bats and 
shovels. The behaviour and threats by his pursuers were such that the 
accused had cause to expect to be killed if they caught him. The plan 
the pursuers had was obvious; they attempted to box the accused in and 
force him to stop. The accused consequently drove in a manner which 
was, no doubt, dangerous to the public. To prevent his intended 
assailants from passing him he drove on several occasions on the wrong 
side of the road, once when approaching the brow of a hill. In short, 
it was a miracle that no one was killed. 
The accused was convicted of dangerous driving and he appealed claiming 
that he had no intent to drive in such a manner but did so to escape 
death or at least grievous bodily harm which would be carried out by 
persons present on the scene. (See section 17 C.C.) 
The County Court judge, in essence, held that it was difficult to find a 
case more deservant of the defence of duress than this one. 
Accused's appeal allowed 
Conviction quashed. 
* * * * * 
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SPATIAL LIMITS TO THE EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY 
ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT MADE INSIDE A DWELLING HOUSE 
Regina v. Fiddler, King and King - County Court of Kootenay - Cranbrook, 
B. C. CC83000315 November 1983 
At 10:50 p.m. police received a complaint that a Lance Fiddler had 
assaulted a woman by striking her over the head, and threatening her 
with a knife. Two hours later a police officer checked a truck parked 
in an odd position outside a house. Bertha Fiddler (one of the accused) 
and another person came out of the house to speak with the officer who 
connected the name Fiddler with the earlier assault complaint. He also 
recognized Lance Fiddler who was inside the house. 
The officer informed Fiddler he was under arrest for causing bodily harm 
and that he was to come with him. Lance declined and after assistance 
arrived he was removed from the house and taken away. This however, had 
not gone as smoothly as it sounds. Bertha Fiddler, had attempted to 
block the officers from entering the home. This resulted in an alter-
cation which involved Edward and Karen King, the persons who were 
charged jointly with Bertha Fiddler for obstructing and assaulting the 
officers in the lawful performance of their duty. 
The Provincial Court Judge had held that: 
" ••• while section 450 of the Criminal Code gave a peace 
officer the right to arrest a person without warrant, it 
did not give the right to do so in the person's home 
without that person's consent or in circumstances not 
approved by common law". 
The trial judge had concluded that, although the Crown proved assaults 
and obstruction, it had failed to show the officers were in the lawful 
performance of their duty. The spatial (space or geographical) limits 
of section 450 were violated when the officers effected the arrest in a 
home without consent. The Crown appealed the acquittal that resulted. 
The trial judge, as well as the County Court Judge agreed to the common 
law that applies to this situation 1. Section 450 does not establish 
geographical limitations. It grants to peace officers the authority to 
arrest without warrant a person who they, on reasonable and probable 
grounds, believe has committed an indictable offence. However, there are 
spatial common law limitations to that authority, based on the principle 
that "a man's home is his castle". The two paragraphs that sum these 
1 R. v. Landry 63 C.C.C. (2nd) 289 - Report of the Canadian Committee of 
Corrections 
- 25 -
limitations up are as follows: 
"A constable has no general right of entry into private 
property for the purpose of obtaining evidence, questioning 
persons or effecting an arrest; every invasion of private 
property, however slight, is a trespass, and no person has the 
right to enter property except by consent, or strictly in 
accordance with some lawful authorization. A constable is in 
this regard in no better position than any member of the 
public and is not entitled to enter premises merely because he 
suspects that something is amiss even though a reasonable 
householder might not object to his doing so if the entry were 
bone fide and no damage was caused". 
In the Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, the applicable 
portion is: 
"We think that a police officer presently (sic) has the right 
to enter premises, including a dwelling house, by force if 
necessary, without a warrant, to prevent the commission of an 
offence which would cause immediate and serious injury to any 
person, if he believes on reasonable and probable grounds that 
any such right to enter premises, including a dwelling house, 
by force if necessary, and without a warrant to effect the 
arrest of a person who has been found committing a serious 
crime; and who is being freshly pursued and who seeks refuge 
in such premises."l 
The officer in this case, came upon a truck which was parked in a 
peculiar position. He checked it and fortuitously found Lance Fiddler, 
who the police were looking for. This obviously does not amount to 
fresh pursuit. 
The leading case in Canada on this issue is Eccles v. Bourque et. al., a 
B. C. case which was finally decided by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The only difference between the two cases is that in Eccles v. Bourque, 
police had a warrant for the arrest of a person while the arrest of 
Fiddler was made without a warrant. The question is whether this makes 
a difference in law. 
Police had reasonable and probable grounds for believing that a man for 
whom warrants were outstanding in Montreal was in the Eccles home. They 
knocked, identified themselves, stated their reasons for baing there, 
gave proper notice of their authority, and searched the house without 
finding the wanted man. Mr. Eccles sued the officers for trespass but 
1 R. v. Landry 63 C.C.C. (2nd) 289 Report of the Canadian Committee of 
Corrections 
2 Semayne's Case (1604) 5 Co. Rep. 91A, 77 E.R. 194. 
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did not get anywhere. The Supreme C~urt of Canada recognized that the 
law of 1604 2 is still valid today. In the famous Semayne's case these 
well-known words were engraved in British legal history: 
"The house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, 
as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for 
his repose." 
The Court reminded that even the Bible (Deuteronomy 24:10) dictates that 
we are not to enter someone else's home to collect a debt. However, it 
was also recognized that private interest must yield to public interest 
on occasion and the Court concluded: 
"The criminal is not immune from arrest in his own home nor in 
the home of one of his friends." 
In the Semayne' s case the Court said when this private interest must 
yield: 
"In all cases when the King is party, the sheriff (if the 
doors be not open) may break the party's house, either to 
arrest him, or to do other execution of the King's process, if 
otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought 
to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to 
open doors." 
In the case of Eccles v. Bourque, warrants 
officers were executing the Queen's process 
private premises did not amount to trespass. 
were involved and 
and their entering 
the 
the 
In this case, no warrant was involved. The Queen's process can only 
come upon a sworn document (information) and the entering of the home 
without a warrant (in the absence of fresh pursuit or consent) in these 
circumstances was not included in the peace officer's authority and the 
arrest was consequently unlawful.2 
Crown's appeal dismissed 
Acquittals upheld. 
* * * * * 
1 See also Finnigan v. Sandiford (1981) 73 CR A.R. 153. 
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HIGH SPEED - DANGEROUS DRIVING 
Regina v. Baldwin County Court of Vancouver Island Victoria 27482 
November 1983 
The accused drove on a motorcycle (capable of doing 240 kilometres per 
hour) up to speeds of 160 kph in a 80 kph zone. He was followed (not 
chased) by police for a distance of 16 kilometres before he was stopped 
by another patrol car. The officer who had followed the accused had not 
activated the emergency equipment on his unmarked patrol car as he 
realized the accused could easily outrun him. All this took place on 
the Island Highway leading over the Malahat during dark hours. On 
several occasions• the accused had passed cars crossing over double 
solid lines. The accused testified in provincial Court during his trial 
for dangerous driving. He admitted the speed but denied that any of his 
driving had endangered any other person. The accused was nonetheless 
convicted. He appealed. 
The County Court Judge found that a jury could attach considerable 
weight to the fact that the officer had allowed the accused to continue 
to drive in a manner he considered dangerous. He should not have 
assumed that the accused would have committed the additional offence of 
trying to outrun him (obstruction). Secondly• the Judge had given no 
consideration to the accused's testimony. 
A jury. properly instructed. could return a verdict of guilty. 
in view of the trial judge not having addressed himself on 
points made above. the accused should have a new trial. 
Appeal allowed 
New trial ordered. 
* * * * * 
However. 
the two 
- 28 -
IS A c.o.2 PISTOL A FIREARM? 
The Queen and W. Covin and The Queen and D. Covin Supreme Court of 
Canada June 1983. 
The accused who robbed a credit union teller armed with a c.o. 2 pistol, 
were convicted of armed robbery but acquitted of using a firearm in the 
commission of an indictable offence (s. 83. c.c.). The Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal had held that the pistol was, no doubt, a weapon for the 
purpose of armed robbery but: 
a jury could not on the evidence have reasonably 
concluded that it was a firearm within the definition in s. 
82(1), as used ins. 83(1)." 
Evidence at trial revealed that the pistol was in a state of disrepair 
and that no less than 14 parts were missing, seven of which are 
essential to its operation. However, an expert would need no more than 
10 minutes to install those parts. Section 82(1) C.C. states: 
"For the purposes of this Part, "firearm" means any barrelled 
weapon from which any shot, bullet missile can be discharged 
and that is capable of causing serious bodily injury or death 
to a person and includes any frame or receiver of such a 
barrelled weapon and anything that can be adopted for use as a 
firearm." 
The portion of the section I underlined establishes that an unloaded but 
otherwise functional barrelled weapon is included in this definition. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the section also includes 
barrelled weapons that have "the potential of becoming a firearm through 
adaptation. 
examined the French version 
certainty the intent of 
a phrase or sentence is 
in the one language be 
while in the other it is 
The Court, as it has done many times before, 
of the law, to determine with greater 
Parliament. There is no doubt that if 
translated into another language, it may 
ambiguous or is subject to multiple meanings, 
more clear or has only one possible meaning. 
In French, literally interpreted, the section states: 
"'Firearm' means any weapon, including the frame or chamber of 
such a weapon and anything that can be adapted to be used as 
such, that is capable, because of a barrel which shot bullets 
or any other missile can be discharged, of causing serious 
bodily harm or death to a person". 
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Of course, a good instrument maker or machinist can, if given time, 
attach parts to a piece of pipe for instance, converting it into a 
firearm. Therefore, in each case, said the Supreme Court of Canada: 
"The purpose of each section should be identified, and the 
amount, nature and time span for adaptation determined so as 
to support Parliament's endeavour when enacting that given 
secton". 
Of course, the Court referred to the section creating the indictable 
offence during the commission of which the firearm was used. An armed 
robbery is usually a crime of short duration while other crimes can be 
committed over an extended period of time. The Supreme Court of Canada, 
in view of this, concluded: 
"Therefore whatever is used on the scene of the crime must in 
my view be proven by the Crown as capable, either at the 
outset or through adaptation or assembly, of being loaded, 
fired and thereby having the potential of causing serious 
bodily harm during the commission of the offence, . or during 
the flight after the commission of that main offence, the 
hold-up". 
In other words, the Courts must consider the scene of the commission of 
the indictable offence; if it is reasonable, considering the 
modification the weapon would have to undergo, to make it functional; 
the availability of the parts at that time and the skill of the accused 
make the modification, to determine if the non-functional barrelled 
weapon at the time of the of fence was a firearm. 
The section does not require that the accused had possession of 
ammunition. If all that is missing to make the barrelled weapon 
functional is the ammunition, it is for the purpose of sections 83(1) 
still a firearm. 
Crown's appeal dismissed 
Dismissal of the charge under s. 83(1) 
was upheld. 
* * * * * 
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IMPAIRED DRIVING - NO EVIDENCE OF ERRATIC DRIVING 
ACCUSED NOT INFORMED OF HIS RIGHTS 
Regina v. Samra County Court of Cariboo Prince George 40/83 October 1983 
Reacting to a complaint, a police officer was looking for a certain 
car. As soon as he spotted the vehicle he stopped it without observing 
the manner in which it was being driven. The symptoms the accused 
displayed resulted in a demand for breath samples. The accused attemp-
ted to give samples by apparent pretences that he was blowing while in 
fact no breath filled the cylinder. Consequently the accused was tried 
for impaired driving and failing to give samples of his breath. He was 
acquitted of both counts because of a lack of evidence of erratic 
driving and of the failure to blow because the officer had not informed 
the accused of his right to counsel. The Crown appealed the acquittals. 
The County Court Judge ordered the accused to stand trial anew on both 
charges. He found that in regards to the impaired driving the Provin-
cial Court Judge had erred. What he should have considered was if the 
accused was driving and if his physical condition was such that his 
ability to drive was impaired by alcohol or a drug. Evidence of erratic 
driving may make the evidence stronger and is undoubtedly supportive of 
what is alleged. However, it is not essential evidence. 
In relation to the failure to inform the accused of his rights to 
counsel the County Court Judge observed that there was no evidence 
adduced, either directly or by !Jleans of cross-examination, that the 
accused was not so informed. If the accused was in fact under arrest or 
detained at the time he was to give the samples of his breath, a failure 
having made him aware of his right to counsel may amount to an infringe-
ment of the accused's rights and the Court, by virtue of s. 24(1) of the 
Charter may remedy that infringement by excluding the evidence if, in 
addition, the conditions mentioned in s. 24(2) of the Charter have been 
shown to exist. However, the onus to show there was such an infringe-
ment is upon the defence. Secondly, a prerequisite to the infringement 
by failure to inform a person of his right to counsel, is evidence that 
he was under arrest or was detained at the time. As we have discussed, 
in many cases of this kind in this publication, accompanying a peace 
officer for the purpose of giving breath samples on demand, does not 
necessarily mean the suspect is detained I. The trial judge had not 
addressed either of these points. 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
New trial ordered. 
* * * * * 
1 Chromiak v. The Queen Supreme Court of Canada (1980) 49 C.C.C. (2d) 
257 
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SURETIES TO KEEP THE PEACE 
WHERE INJURY OR DAMAGE FEARED 
The ueen and Forrest Supreme Court of B. c. Nelson Registry No. S.C. 
100 1983 November 1983 
Mrs. Forrest swore an information under section 745 c.c. stating to fear 
that her husband would cause injury to her. 
The Justice of the Peace issued process and Mr. Forrest "was brought 
before him". However, Mrs. Forrest, the informant, was not present. 
This created a problem as the Justice of the Peace could not do anything 
remedial for the complainant unless he is "satisfied by the evidence 
adduced that the informant has reasonable grounds for her fear". 
Relying on section 457 c.c. that he was authorized to do so, the Justice 
of the Peace adjourned to a date for the hearing to be held and released 
Mr. Forrest on an undertaking that he would not go on the property of 
his wife. Mr. Forrest breached the undertaking and was charged under 
section 133(3) C.C. for failing to live up to the conditions of the 
undertaking. 
When he appeared before a Provincial Court Judge on that charge, the 
information was dismissed. The Judge held that the provisions for 
adjournments and recognizance or undertakings under section 457 c.c. had 
no application to proceedings described in section 745 C.C. The Crown 
appealed the dismissal by stated case. 
In p~oceedings under section 745 C.C. there is no accused and no one is 
charged with an offence. The provisions contained in the section are 
preventative in nature. Section 457 exclusively provides for interim 
releases for persons charged with offences. The Crown took the position 
that the "mutatis mutandis" in section 728(1) C.C. overcomes the 
difficulty. After all, the term means "with the necessary changes in 
points of detail". 
The Supreme Court Justice in essence said that mutatis mutandis cannot 
change a bungalow into a sky scraper simply because both are buildings. 
He said that using the words to change a person not charged with any 
offence (but is merely a person against whom proceedings have been 
initiated under a preventative measure (s. 745 C.C.)), into the position 
of an accused charged with an offence constitute a change in substance 
and not "a change in points of detail". 
The message is that the complainant should be available to testify when 
the person who is feared is brought before the Justice of the Peace or a 
Provincial Court Judge. 
* * * * * 
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MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS ARISING FROM ONE INCIDENT - DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
BREAK AND ENTER - ROBBERY - ATTEMPTED MURDER 
Regina v. Wigman - 6 c.c.c. (3d) 289 
B. C. Court of Appeal 
In the early morning the accused broke into an apartment where a Mrs. 
W. lived alone. Late in the afternoon of the same day the apartment 
block manager found Mrs. W. for dead lying on the floor of her suite. 
The accused pleaded guilty to break and enter and to robbery but found 
himself also charged with attempt to murder. At his trial he testified 
how he had broken into the apartment with a fellow he only knew as 
"David". While the accused was gathering up the loot in the living 
room, David had gone into the bedroom. When the accused entered the 
bedroom, he found David delivering a beating to the woman. However, a 
conviction of attempt to murder followed. 
In 1974, a party by the name of Kienapplel questioned the Supreme Court 
of Canada on how he could find himself convicted of (then) rape and 
sexual intercourse with a female person under the age of fourteen years 
where the two convictions arose from one incident of sexual inter-
course. Basically the Supreme Court of Canada said that since both 
offences had sexual intercourse as an essential ingredient, the two 
convictions arising from one such act was improper. Although sexual 
intercourse with an underaged female person is not included in rape, the 
raping of such a person inescapably and inevitably amounts to the 
offence of sexual intercourse with a female person under the age of 
fourteen years. When rape was proved in one trial there was nothing to 
be proved in the other except the victim's age. 
It seems not an exaggeration to say that there has been a great deal of 
confusion about the "Kienapple" principle. Some judges have held it to 
mean that if there is one incident of wrongdoing, only one conviction 
can result in the absence of a specific direction to the contrary in 
legislation. Others have held that the principle only applies when 
there are two offences alleged arising from one incident, which have 
essential ingredients in common. This discrepancy was cleared up 
(apparently) by the Supreme Court of Canada in 19802 when the Chief 
Justice (who also wrote the reasons for judgment in Kienapple) said: 
"... this Court was concerned with a single act which gave 
rise to two different offences, and it held that multiple 
convictions could not be supported for the same delict or for 
the same cause or matter or where the same or substantially 
the same elements entered into two different offences." 
(Emphasis is mine). 
1 Kienapple v. The Queen (1974) 15 c.c.c. (2d) 524. 
2 Scheppe v. The Queen (1980) 51 c.c.c. (2d) 481. 
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Applying what it thought was the proper application of the Kienapple 
principle the B. C. Court of Appeal held that the violence in the 
robbery was distinct from the violence when the woman was struck. Any 
kind of violence or threat of it, would have been sufficient to support 
the robbery conviction. However, the striking of the woman with the 
inferred intent to cause death or being reckless whether death ensued, 
to which the accused was at least a party, amounted to attempt to 
murder. 
Said the B. C. Court of Appeal: 
"On the facts in this case there were two offences involving 
the same violence, but I have no difficulty in reaching the 
conclusion that different factual and legal elements underlie 
the two offences." 
* * * * * 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS - INCRIMINATION 
CAN A PERSON CHARGED AS AN ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT 
BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY AGAINST THE PRINCIPAL OFFENDER? 
Regina v. Bleick 7 c.c.c. (3d) 176 Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench 
A Mr. Ruben was called as a witness by the Crown to assist proving that 
the accused Bleick had committed murder. Mr. Ruben objected and claimed 
that he was not compellable to testify. The Crown alleged, in separate 
proceedings of course, that Mr. Ruben had assis.ted the accused to escape 
while he was fully aware that the accused had committed murder. Ruben's 
trial had yet to take place and of course, a prerequisite to his convic-
tion was proof that the man he helped escape had committed murder. In 
other words, the Crown compelled Ruben to help convict himself. This he 
claimed, is contrary to the self-crimination provisions in the Charter 
and he took his plea to the Court of Queen's Bench to obtain an order 
not to be compelled to testify at the trial of the accused Bleick. 
The Charter assures that we have a right not to be compelled to be a 
witness in proceedings against ourselves. It also states that when we 
do testify in proceedings commenced against ourselves or someone else 
and the testimony is incriminating, it may not be used against us in 
subsequent proceedings. This, of course, was not sufficient to remedy 
the situation for the accused. We must assume that Ruben's testimony 
was important to the Crown and that it would assist to convict Bleick. 
Of course none of Ruben's testimony can be used when he is tried, but 
the conviction he is compelled to assist in obtaining is one of the 
three major ingredients necessary to prove that he (Ruben) is guilty of 
the crime alleged against him (accessory after the fact). As a matter 
of fact, the Supreme Court of Canada held in 19741 that: 
• • • an accessory after the fact may not be tried or enter a 
valid plea of ,guilty until the principal is convicted, so that 
if the latter is acquitted the accessory must, of necessity, 
be discharged." 
Courts of Appeal have interpreted this ruling to mean (particularly in 
view of section 581 C.C.) that if there is proof that the person who was 
assisted after the fact, had committed the principal crime, and that the 
assistant knew this, the latter can be convicted. They reasoned that if 
the escape was successful or if the principal died, the accessory should 
not necessarily escape prosecution and conviction2. This tends to 
provide that Mr. Ruben can be prosecuted and convicted whether or not 
Mr. Bleick, the accused, is convicted. 
1 R. v. Vinette 19 c.c.c. (2d) 1. 
2 R. v. Anderson (1980) 57 C.C.C. (2d) 255. 
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All these cases were decided prior to the Charter becoming effective and 
the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench had to decide if the provisions it 
contains in respect to self-crimination brought about any change to 
these precedents. 
The Court concluded after reviewing a number of cases decided since 
April of 1982 that Mr. Ruben was compellable but that his testimony 
could not be used to incriminate him at his own trial. The Charter, as 
the law did in the past, only provides protection against compulsion to 
testify against oneself. 
Mr. Ruben's application was dismissed. 
* * * * * 
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
DISCIPLINARY AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
ARISING FROM THE SAME INCIDENT 
R. v. W. 7 C.C.C. (3d) 170 Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
Constable W. apparently pursued his duties with too much enthusiasm in 
that he had choked and slapped a suspected impaired driver until the 
latter confessed that he had been the driver of the car. Consequently, 
the constable was convicted of a major service offence under the 
R.C.M.Police Act and fined $300. 
The constable also found himself charged with assault under the Criminal 
Code, but the Provincial Court Judge had quashed the "information" as, 
in view of the disciplinary proceedings, a subsequent charge arising 
from the same incident would offend section ll(h) of the Charter which 
states: 
"Any person charged with an offence has the right if 
finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be 
tried or punished for it again ...... 
He had reasoned that, despite the fact the charge of assault and the 
disciplinary default were distinct from one another, they, in fact, 
alleged the same offence. 
The Crown appealed this decision claiming that section ll(h) of the 
Charter did not apply in this case and that the two offences were not 
the same and not an alternative to one another. The Court agreed and 
reviewed a case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada l in which that 
Court pointed out that by joining the Force one agrees "to enter into a 
body of special relations" and submits to certain restrictions on his 
freedom. The created offences amount to a code of law of domestic 
discipline regulating behaviour and discipline. The offences may, but 
are usually not an offence "of a regular nature to be tried in the 
regular courts of criminal jurisdiction". But even where a disciplinary 
default does also happen to be, in the circumstances, a public offence, 
they are separate and distinct from one another. In view of this, Cst. 
W. was not subjected to double jeopardy, section ll(h) of the Charter 
has no application and the Court did set aside the constable's acquittal 
and substituted a conviction for assault. 
* * * * * 
l Regina and Archer v. White (1955) 114 c.c.c. 77 •. See also R. v. Rees 
[1981] 2 W.W.R. 657. 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
IS AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH? 
Regina v. Cameron The County Court of Westminster New Westminster 
Registry X820067 November 1983 
Customs officials intercepted a parcel addressed to the accused and 
containing two pounds of marihuana, in the mails from Hawaii. One 
police constable arranged to get dressed up as a mailman, while another 
went to a Justice of the Peace to apply (successfully) for a search 
warrant upon reasonable and probable grounds for believing that in the 
accused's home narcotics were kept. Everything went off as planned; as 
soon as the delivery was made the search warrant was executed, the 
narcotics were seized, and the accused was charged accordingly. 
The defence claimed that the search warrant was invalid (it was issued 
prior to the package being delivered) and the search, consequently, 
unreasonable. This is contrary to section 8 of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms and should be remedied by excluding the evidence obtained 
thereby, as provided for under section 24(2) of the Charter. 
The County Court Judge was of the opinion that the search warrant was 
unquestionably invalid. The officer swore prior to the delivery that he 
had it from a reliable source that narcotics were kept in the home. His 
grounds for so believing were related to the narcotics which were to be 
delivered some time hence. This rendered the search of the accused's 
home unlawful. But, is an unlawful search automatically an unreasonable 
search? The County Court Judge did not entirely agree that this 
American doctrine of law is an appropriate test to determine if a search 
in these circumstances is reasonable. He commented that, since the 
officers themselves delivered the contraband, they knew the narcotics 
were in the home and it would not have been unreasonable for them to 
have searched the house, if "all other matters had propriety". The 
snag, of course, was the search warrant. However, he said: 
"I think one would start with the proposition that a search 
that was in substance without authority is in the absence of a 
satisfactory explanation, taking into consideration the 
totality of the circumstances, a search which starts upon the 
proposition that it is an 'unreasonable' search." 
The County Court Judge held that the police officers knew the warrant 
was invalid and so did the Justice of the Peace. Although the Judge was 
sure that these people were well motivated, he thought that particularly 
the actions of the Justice of the Peace, who was to act judicially, was 
"extremely disturbing". Awesome powerful documents are issued by the 
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Courts to assist police in their investigation. If the judiciary became 
sympathetic in issuing these documents and would do so without the 
prerequisite grounds existing, the only safeguard for the Courts to 
ensure the public that the judicial process is not abused, would be to 
have the authorities prove the validity of the documents to the . target 
persons, before they were executed (the documents that is). Would a 
deliberate short cut as was taken in this case shock the community? The 
resounding answer is "Yes" the judge thought. 
The Court also reviewed the police actions. He firstly observed that 
police, when they are up against sophisticated and cunning criminals, 
must and are expected to adopt methods that deceive and are less than 
honest. Treachery and deception on the part of police are often totally 
acceptable and frequently amount "to the best police work the community 
and the courts have seen". Police talents in "dramatic arts" have been 
both novel and necessary. In such circumstances, the Courts have 
solidly supported the police and held that their deception did not bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute. 
In this case the delivery of the narcotic was in fact "planting" the 
evidence. In view of the fact that the contraband was on route to the 
accused anyway and that non intervention on the part of police would 
have resulted in her eventually being in possession of it, brought the 
planting within the acceptable realm of police practice; but only 
marginally. The practice in circumstances like these, was not to be 
encouraged. Despite the fact police did nothing to mislead the Justice 
of the Peace, they were still party to the execution of an invalid 
search warrant. 
Regretting to have to dismiss an indictment where appropriate 
investigation would have resulted in a conviction, the County Court 
Judge discharged the accused. 
* * * * * 
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QUESTIONING A SUSPECT VIA AN INTERPRETER 
As our communities are becoming more cosmopolitan in character, the 
likelihood of police officers having to question a person with whom they 
cannot converse directly, due to a language barrier, is far from 
remote. It seems, therefore, appropriate to review the law on how 
statements made to a person in authority should be taken to maximize the 
possibility of having them admitted in evidence. 
Persons in authority are inclined to use an interpreter like one would a 
mechanical device which enables them to gain access to something. They 
seem to compare the interpreter's part in the interview to that of the 
locksmith when they want a door opened. However, interpreters are much 
more than that and are unique in their legal status when it comes to 
their role in obtaining a statement. 
It is important to apply the common law hearsay rule to the taking of a 
statement by a person in authority via an interpreter. Although this 
test is not exhaustive, it is safe to say that when one testifies to 
a fact and cannot personally vouch for the truth of that fact, then the 
testimonial area he is involved in better be one of the thirty some 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
When an accused person relates his version of an incident to a person in 
authority, the latter may relate this to the Court as an exception to 
the hearsay rule. After all, the person in authority cannot likely 
vouch for the truth of the content of that statement. If the officer 
cannot directly communicate with a suspect and does so through an 
interpreter, the "hearsay" aspect is certainly aggrevated. It is not 
only the truth of the content of the statement he cannot vouch for, he 
cannot even vouch for the fact that the statement was made. All he can 
say is that the accused spoke in a language he did not understand. 
The exception to the hearsay rule in regards to statements by an accused 
person includes utterances made in the presence and hearing of the 
accused, as long as he associates himself to what is being said. If you 
apply this rule to the scenario so common when someone is questioned by 
means of an interpreter, it does not take much to run into snags. 
Legally and for the purpose of the rule there is not one conversation 
that takes place, but two. One is when the officer speaks to the 
interpreter, or vice versa. They have a conversation in the presence of 
the accused, but not within his hearing considering that this includes 
understanding what is being said. The other conversation that takes 
place between the accused and the interpreter is not understood by the 
officer. As a matter of fact, when the officer makes notes in English 
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of the conversation that took place, those notes record only the 
conversation between the interpreter and himself. He has no clue, and 
cannot swear to it that his notes reflect what the accused said. The 
interpreter's endorsement of the English notes, indicating that they are 
accurate in terms of what the accused told him, do not assist the 
officer in enabling him to testify as to what the accused said. The 
interpreter seems the king pin and the all important link. He is the 
only one who can relate what the accused said and verify the accuracy of 
the notes taken, whether by himself or the officer. 
It also remains a question, particularly when the interpreter is a 
civilian, whose agent he is. In some cases the interpreter is obviously 
there at the behest of the person in authority, but regardless who 
engaged him or selected him he remains the mainstay. 
The cases that deal with this issue are not that plentiful. The one 
mostly adhered to in Canada and Britain is R. v. Attord (1958)1 decided 
by the English Central Criminal Court. Attard only spoke Maltese and he 
had been questioned by a police officer via an interpreter in respect to 
a murder. At Attord's trial the police officer's testimony of what 
Attard had said, had not been allowed in evidence. Said the Court, "the 
evidence ought not to be given through the mouth of the police officer 
in the witness box" in that his testimony was entirely hearsay. 
There are two Australian and three American cases on this point. In 
one Australian case R. v. Wong and Wong (1957)2, the court would not 
allow the evidence of the accused's utterances to be given other than b~ 
the interpreter. In another Australian case, Gais v. The Queen (1960) 
an illiterate Papua was used as an interpreter. The accused Gais had 
confessed to murder. The interpreter had testified that he could not 
recall what Gais had said to him but he swore that he had accurately 
relayed to the investigating officer what the a ccused had told him. 
Because of the illiteracy problem the Court had a llowed the officer to 
testify what the interpreter had told him the accused said. In the 
American cases the law as stated in Attard (supra) was followed with the 
exception of one, Commonwealth v. Vose (1892)q. In that case the Court 
held that the interpreter is a "joint agent" and that persons who adopt 
a mode of communication through an interpreter must be assumed to be 
trustworthy and the officer was allowed to testify what he was told the 
accused said in a language he did not understand. 
In a 1970 Vancouver case, Regina v. Kores,5 a County Court Judge totally 
1 43 Criminal Appeal R. 90 
2 (1957] S.R. (N.S.W.) 582 
3 Gais v. The Queen (1960) 104 C.L.R. 419 
4 32 N.E. 355 
5 5 c.c.c. 1970 55. 
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rejected the "agency doctrine". He held that the law as stated in 
Attord is correct. Kores was charged under the Immigration Act and had 
been questioned by an investigating police officer who did not under-
stand a word of Greek, the only language Kores claimed to speak. A 
stenographer, who only spoke English and an interpreter were present at 
the interview. The Crown, in an attempt to follow the law as esta-
blished in Attord (supra), called first the interpreter who told the 
Court that he h.ad to the best of his ability translated from Greek into 
English and vice versa during the interview. He had not made any riotes 
and could not of his own recollection say what the questions and answers 
were. 
The next question put to the interpreter by Crown Counsel was if the 
officer had told the accused that he did not have to say anything. 
Defence counsel objected and the debate was on. The County Court Judge 
held that neither the officer nor the interpreter could give any of the 
conversation they had in the English language. Only the interpreter 
could tell the Court in English what he had said to Kores in Greek and 
what Kores had answered in that language, and of that conversation he 
had no recollection. To the best of my knowledge this and other cases, 
have established the law in Canada as it still is today. 
The cases suggest that the interpreter should make notes of the conver-
sation. The cases where this was most successful is where the inter-
preter's notes were in the language spoken by the suspect. Any bilingu-
al person knows that to give a precise interpretation that reflects the 
true meaning or tenor of a statement can be very difficult. Sometimes a 
word or phrase in one language with a specific meaning cannot be trans-
lated into another language but must be described as to its meaning. 
Simultaneous interpretations can do injustice to what is actually being 
said. Notes made by the officer in English are not anywhere near as 
accurate and reliable as notes by the interpreter in the language spoken 
by the accused. If the officer is the only one who has made notes 
(which is second best) then at least the interpreter must while the 
conversation he (and not the officer) had with the accused is still 
fresh in his mind, certify or indicate that those notes reflect that 
conversation. The doctrine of "recorded recollection" must be applied. 
The matters discussed in this article do, of course, only apply where a 
statement is adduced to prove the truth of its content and not just the 
fact that it was made. The ills identified are not likely remedied by 
electronically recording everything that took place during the interview 
as some suggest. Furthermore, when the statement is simultaneously 
transcribed in English, the suspect's signature on it would be meaning-
less and whether or not it would have any value as an exhibit is 
questionable. 
* * * * * 
